2014년 12월 27일 토요일
2014년 11월 16일 일요일
[아침안개 군사논평] 북한의 ‘2015 통일대전’에 대한 소고
[아침안개 군사논평] 북한의 ‘2015 통일대전’에 대한 소고
이 글은 개인 의견이며 주장입니다.
대한민국의 안보정책과 다른 내용일 수 있음을 알립니다.
1. 북한의 ‘2015 통일대전’이란?
● 최근 언론 매체에 보도되어 관심을 모은 북한의 ‘2015 통일대전’에 대한 정부 차원의 언급은
2014년 10월 7일 국방부에 대한 국정감사에서 국방부의 업무보고 내용에 포함되었기 때문이다.
당시 국방부의 업부보고 내용에는
〖북한이 2015년을 ‘통일대전 완성의 해’로 선포하고
전 병종별 실전적 전술훈련과 전력증강을 통해 ‘전면전’ 준비 활동을 벌이고 있다.
북한의 군사동향과 관련, 하계훈련을 예년 대비 약 2배 증가하고 방사포 등 타격전력 증강을 지속하고 있다〗
라고 하여, 북한의 ‘2015 통일대전’의 개념과 북한의 준비상황을 간략하게 언급하고 있다.
● 그러나 북한의 매체가 ‘2015 통일대전’을 언급한 것은
2013년 10월 22일 개최된 ‘인민군 제2차 중대장 및 중대정치지도원 대회’에서 김정은이 언급한 것이다.
김정은 당시 【2015년까지는 무슨일이 있어도 통일 이루겠다】고 선포했다.
2. 북한의 ‘2015 통일대전’의 배경
북한이 ‘2015 통일대전’을 선포하고 한반도의 긴장국면을 조성하며 내부결집을 시도하는 배경에는
북한내부와 외부적인 요소와 정치군사적 요인들이 복합적으로 작용하고 있다고 보인다.
1) 북한 내부 배경
● 북한은 1945년 이후 현재가지 70 여 년 간 “한반도의 적화통일”을 북한 국내정치의 근간으로 설정하고,
북한의 경제산업구조를 군수경제화 하여 운용해 왔고,
김씨 일가의 정권을 유지하는 정치체계를 구축하였으며 주민통제의 수단으로 사용해 왔다.
● 시장경제를 왜곡한 ‘북한식 군수경제’의 불합리성과 모순으로 ‘중앙통제의 국가경제’의 붕괴가 발생하였다.
이로 인해 1996년부터 2000년까지 세칭 ‘고난의 행군 시기’에 수 많은 아사자가 발생하는 등
북한경제가 몰락하여 국가경제가 파탄이 나고 정권의 존망의 기로에 서게 되었다.
● 따라서 북한의 김씨정권을 유지하는 중요한 근간인 경제의 중앙통제가 와해되었고,
이의 영향으로 주민통제가 과거와 달리 상당히 이완되어 정권유지의 패러다임 변화가 수반되었다.
● 북한정권이 정권과 체제유지를 위해 선택한 패러다임은
한반도에서 군사적 긴장감을 고조시켜 외부세계와의 협상을 통해 경제적 실익을 챙기는 ‘구걸경제’와
북한군과 주민의 통제를 유지하는 ‘선군정치’로 변화하였다.
이러한 북한의 내부정치적 요인으로 발생한 것이 ‘핵개발의 본격화’, ‘미사일개발’, ‘천안함 피격사건’,
‘연평도포격사건’ 등과 같은 현상으로 나타난 것이다.
● 문제점은 북한의 내부정치 상황에서 기인한 ‘한반도의 군사적 긴장 고조’는
점진적으로 그 강도가 증가할 수 밖에 없는 구조적 문제점이 있다는 것이다.
즉 대한민국과 서방세계가 북한의 군사도발에 내성을 갖게 되므로
북한은 자신들의 정치목적을 달성하기 위해 도발의 강도을 축차적으로 증가시켜야 만 한다는 점이다.
북한의 군사적 도발이 저강도에서 고강도로 변화하는 이유이다.
● 핵개발로 인한 국제사회의 각종 제재와 ‘천안함 피격’으로 인한 대한민국의 경제협력 중단등으로
체제유지에 곤란함을 겪고 있는 북한의 김씨정권이 최후의 카드인 ‘전면전’의 가능성을 시사하는
‘2015 통일대전’이라는 빼어 든 것이다.
2) 북한 외부 배경
● 전통적 우방인 중국의 대북정책의 변화가 북한정권에 심한 압박으로 작용하고 있다.
이는 북한의 국제적 고립이 가중되는 것이다.
이를 타개하기 위해 북한은 아프리카의 제3세게 국가에 대한 외교와 러시아와의 관계를 급속이 강화하고 있다.
그러나 북한의 이러한 대응은 북한이 당면한 문제를 해결하지는 못 할 것이다.
북한내부 문제의 근본적이 원인인 경제문제를 해결하기에는
아프리카 국가와 러시아의 역량이 부족하기 때문이다.
● 특히 러시아의 대북정책은 실리적인 접근으로 전략적 효용성에 한계가 있다고 보아야 한다.
따라서 한반도의 분단상황이 유지되면서 안정되기 바라는 중국의 대한반도 전략을 자극하고
미국과 대립각을 세우고 있는 러시아를 끌어들이기 위한 전략으로
한반도에서 ‘전면전’의 발발 가능성을 시사하는 ‘2015 통일대전’을 언급한 것이라고 판단된다.
● 최근 들어서는 UN인권위원회에서 추진하는 ‘김정은에 대한 기소’ 문제로
북한에 대한 국제적 압력이 증가됨에 따라 ‘한반도에서 고강도 군사적 충돌 가능성’을
국제적 협상의 카드로 사용하려는 의도도 있다고 보아야 한다.
3) 군사적 배경
● 북한군은 ‘조선노동당’의 무력역량이다.
즉, 국가의 군대가 아니고 ‘노동당’의 무력인 것이다.
● 북한의 ‘노동당’ 강령을 보면, 노동당의 존재이유를 ‘한반도의 무력통일’로 규정하고 있다.
따라서 북한군은 노동당의 강령을 수행할 의무가 있는 것이다.
● 이런 이유로 북한의 경제구조가 군수경제가 되어 국가경제의 파탄을 유래했던 것이다.
문제는 지난 70년 간 지속적으로 ‘무력통일’을 외치며, 북한군을 통제해 온 김씨정권이
북한군을 통제하고 선무하기 위한 정치적 한계점에 도달했다는 것이다.
시대가 바뀌고 상황이 바뀌는 세상에서 70년을 한결같이 ‘무력통일’을 외치며 전쟁준비를 해 온 북한군은
지칠대로 지쳐있다.
● 또한 북한군의 무기 대부분이 1980년대 양산된 것이다.
무기란 지속적으로 개량되어야 하나, 북한의 군수경제가 파탄되어 무기의 개량과 개발이 지난 30여 년 간
제대로 이루어지지 못하여 전쟁에 대한 자신감이 감소하고 있다.
‘연평도 포격 사건’ 당시 북한군이 발사한 포탄의 불발과 불량문제가
북한군 내부에서 심각하게 거론되었다는 자유아시방송의 보도가 있었다.
또한 최룡해가 총정치국장에서 해임된 이유가
“이대로 10년이 지나면 북한군은 통일전쟁을 수행할 수 없을 지경이 된다”라고 김정은에게 보고한 것이라는
탈북자 언론매체의 보도가 이러한 북한군의 실상을 단적으로 보여준다 하겠다.
● 현재 북한군에서는 ‘이대로 주저앉느니 어느 정도 여력이 있을 때 전쟁을 하자’는 주장이 있을 수도 있는
상황이라고 보인다.
4) 북한 내부의 정치적 배경
● 2013년 10월 북한군 중대장 및 중대정치지도원 대회에서 김정은은
‘2015 통일대전’을 공시적으로 언급함으로써, 스스로 정치적 부담을 갖게되었다.
● 김정은이 ‘2015 통일대전’을 감행하지 못하면 북한과 북한군에 대한 김정은의 체면이 깍이는 것이되고
정치적 불안정성이 발생할 수 도 있다.
● 그러나 북한의 재래식 전력은
중국과 러시아의 지원없이는 대한민국과 미국의 연합전력을 상대할 수 없다는 것이 객관적인 판단이다.
● 김정은과 북한군 지휘부는 2015년에 ‘통일대전’을 감행할 수도 않 할 수 도 없는
진퇴양난의 상황에 빠져있는 것이다.
☞ 소결론
(1) 북한정권이 당면하고 있는 현재의 북한정치체계, 군수산업화 되어 있는 경제구조, ‘고난의 행군시절’ 이후
느슨해진 북한주민의 정권 충성도 등을 고려할 때, 북한정권이 체제를 유지하는 데 어려움이 많다.
따라서 ‘한반도의 군사적 긴장을 조성하여 체제를 유지한다’는 북한내부의 정치 패러다임이
수정되지 않는 이상, 북한정권은 군사도발의 강도을 지속적으로 증가시킬 수 밖에 없다.
(2) 지난 70여 년 간 ‘북한정치’의 근간을 이룬 ‘항일업적’과 ‘한반도의 적화통일’로 대변되는
북한정치의 메커니즘이 한계점에 다다랐다.
따라서 북한내부 정치의 한계에서 기인한 임계점이 ‘2015 통일재전’이라는 용어로 표출된 것이라고
보아야 한다.
(3) 북한정권의 버팀목인 북한군은 보유한 무기의 노후화로 ‘존재하되 실용가치가 없는 군대’가 되어가고 있다.
이러한 점을 인식하고 있는 북한군 내부의 강경세력이 ‘전면전’을 주장하고 있을 수 있다.
3. 북한의 ‘2015 통일대전’의 실행 가능성
1) 2014년 북한군의 군사행보
- 2014.1.10 : 야간공수훈련 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.1.18 : 김정은 ‘최고사령관 훈련명령서’
☞ 대대급 전술훈련을 연대급 전술훈련으로 상향할 것 : 자유북한방송
- 2014.1.24 : 북한군 제11항공육전대이 인천공항 타격 및 점거훈련
☞ AN-2동원, 청와대안보회의 : 중앙일보
- 2014.2.11 : 노동적위대 지휘관 열성자대회 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.2.18 : 북한군, 겨울철 서해서 이례적 잠수함 활동 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.2.25 : 北경비정 1척, 어젯밤∼오늘새벽 3차례 서해NLL 침범 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.2.27 : 北, 사거리 200㎞이상 탄도미사일 4발 발사 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.3.3 : 탄도미사일 1발 발사 -사거리 500여㎞ - 스커드-C 혹은 스커드-ER 추정 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.3.4 : 北, 방사포 '무력시위'…오늘만 총 7발 발사 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.3.5 : 북한군 현역 복무년한 연장 : 자유아시아방송
- 2014.3.8 : 김정은, 북한군 “국방지휘참모훈련”에 친필 지시
☞ 전쟁준비에서 빈 구석과 걸린문제들을 똑똑히 찾아내고 필요한 대책을 세우는
계기가 되었다 : 자유북한방송
- 2014.3.23 : 北, 신형 고속 침투선박 건조…동해안서 첫 시험 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.3.25 : 원산에서 국가급 합동훈련 실시 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.3.27 : 北, 최전방 국군진지 '점령연습' 강화 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.3.31 : 평양 미림비행장에서 대규모 화력시범 실시 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.3. : 항공 및 반항공군 제2620부대와 제188부대 비행훈련 : 연합훈련
- 2014.3.31. : 북한군 해안포와 방사포로 500여발 사격
☞北포탄 100여발 NLL이남 낙하…軍, 300여발 대응사격 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.4.3 : 백령도 추락 北무인기 소청도·대청도도 정찰비행 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.4.22 : 공 및 반항공군 제188부대의 비행훈련 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.4.24 : 北 김정은, 여성 방사포부대 포사격 훈련 참관 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.4.27 : 곡산포 사격훈련 실시
- 2014.4.29 : 北, 서해NLL 인근서 50여발 해상사격 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.5.9 : 전투비행술 경기대회
☞MiG-29동원 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.5.22 : 北, 연평도 우리 초계함정 인근에 2발 포격 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.5.26 : 북한 신형 소형구축함 2척 건조 - 39North 보도
- 2014.5.27 : 당중앙위원회, 당군기관원 및 주민 불시 복귀명령 하달 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.6.8 : 전군 포병부대에 새 사격수칙 전달
☞조준사격에서 밀집사격, 면적사격으로 변경
☞ 만약에 전쟁이 일어나면 마지막전쟁이기 때문에 더 이상 포탄이 필요없다
(8군단 간부) : 자유아시아 방송
- 2013.6.13 : 김정은 ‘여도방어대’ 시찰 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.6.17 : 북한 지대함순항미사일 개발 : BBC
- 2014.6.27 : 초정밀 전술유도탄 시험발사 성공-300mm MRLS 추정 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.7.1 : 김정은 ‘화도방어대’ 시찰 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.7.2 : 해군함대 고위지휘관 수영대회 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.7.5 : 육군.해군. 항공및반항공군 연합 도서 상룍훈련 실시 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.7.7 : 김정은 ‘웅도방어대’ 시찰 & 김정은, 로켓 발사훈련 지도 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.7.14 : 고성 MDL인근서 방사포.해안포 100여발 동해로 발사 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.7.21 : 서해 남포서 국가급 상륙훈련 준비 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.7.26 : 황해도 장산곶 일대에서 동북 방향 동해 상으로 사거리 500km 내외의 스커드 계열 추정
탄도 미사일을 발사 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.7.30 : 北, 300㎜ 방사포 추정 단거리 발사체 4발 발사 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.9.6 : 원산에서 단거리 발사체 3발 또 동해로 발사
☞ '신형 전술미사일' 추정, 사거리 210여㎞ : 연합뉴스
- 2014.9.15 : 대남 전면전을 위한 전비태세 강화 - 비상동원이 미비한 제1군단장 강등 : 자유북한방송
- 2014.9.19 : 북한 단속정 1척 서해NLL 침범…경고사격 받고 퇴각 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.9.26 : 김정은, '군복무 1년 연장·女 의무복무제' 지시 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.10.7 : 북한해군 경비정 1척 NLL 침범…남북 함정 서로 사격 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.10.10 : 북한, 대북전단에 고사총 총격 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.10.18~19 : 파주 군사분계선 인근 &
철원군 북방 MDL로 접근하는 북한군에 대해 경고방송과 경고사격 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.10.19 : 공군비행사 이착륙훈련 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.10.24 : 526대연합부대 Vs 478연합부대의 쌍방 실기동 훈련 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.10.31~11.5 : 전국연합 반항공훈련 : 자유아시아방송
- 2014.10.29~10.31 : 전국 민간 반항공 대피훈련 : 자유아시아방송
- 2014.10.30 : 항공 및 반항공군 제1017군부대, 제447군부대, 제458군부대 전투비행사들의
'검열비행훈련' 참관 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.11.3~4 : 인민군 제3차 대대장 및 정치지도원 대회 : 연합뉴스
- 2014.11.10 : JAS지역 MDL 선상까지 접근해서 도발 - 우리군 20여 발 경고사격 : 연합뉴스
위의 내용은 국내 언론에 보도된 북한군의 동향이다.
이 중에는 통상적인 군사활동과 특이한 군사활동이 있다.
2) 2014년 북한군의 특이 사항
☛ 고급지휘관의 지휘능력과 실전능력 평가
- 2월 : 노동적위대 지휘관 열성자대회
- 3월 : 국방지휘참모훈련
- 3월 : 군종사령관, 정치위원, 군단장, 군단정치위원 사격대회
- 5월 : 전투비행술대회
☛ 야전지휘관 사상무장과 전술훈련
- 1월 : 인천공항 타격 및 점거훈련
- 4월 : 815군단 포병여단의 곡산포 사격훈련
- 6월~7월 : 화도, 여도, 웅도 방어훈련
- 10월 : 공군비행사 이착륙 훈련
- 11월 : 제3차 대대장 정치지도원 대회
☛ 합동 전술훈련
- 3월 : 원산에서 국가급 합동훈련
- 3월 : 미림 화력시법
- 7월 : 남포 국가급 상륙훈련
- 10월 : 526대연합부대 Vs 478연합부대의 쌍방 실기동 훈련
☛ 국가급 전국단위 훈련
- 10월 : 전국 민간 반항공 대피훈련
- 11월 : 전국연합 반항공훈련
☛ 신형무기개발
- 3월 : 신형 고속침투선박 건조 후 동해에서 실험
- 5월 : 신형 소형구축함 건조
- 6월 : 신형 지대함미사일
- 6월 : 초정밀 전술유도탄
- 10월 : 잠수함발사 탄도미사일 수직발사관 개발
☞ 소결론
(1) 북한은 2014년 상반기에 각군의 지휘관 지휘능력을 평가와 합동전술훈련 등을 집중적으로 실시 평가한 후
문제점을 보완하거나 인사이동을 한 것으로 보인다.
● 인민무력부장을 장정남에서 현영철로 교체(6월)
● 815군단 포병여단의 지휘관 강등
(2) 합동전술훈련은 상반기에는 도서상륙 및 방어훈련을 중심으로 실시하고,
하반기에는 군단급 기동훈련을 실시한 것으로 판단된다.
(3) 중대, 대대급 야전지휘관의 사상무장을 강화한 것으로 보인다.
● 2013.10.20 중대장 및 중대정치지도원 재회
● 2014.11.03 대대장 및 대대정치지도원 대회
(4) 결론적으로 ‘전면전’을 상정하여 야전부대의 지휘능력과 전술훈련을 체계적으로 실시함과 동시에
대한민국의 역습을 대비한 방어훈련과 주민대피훈련을 함께 실시한 것으로 보인다.
3) 북한이 ‘2015 통일대전’을 수행할 군사적 역량에 관하여
(1) 북한의 ‘전쟁지속 능력’
● 북한이 문자 그대로 ‘통일대전’을 수행하려면 ‘전면전’을 벌여야 한다.
‘국지전’에 ‘통일대전’이라는 명칭을 사용할 수는 없다.
● ‘전면전’은 ‘국가 총력전’이다.
따라서 야전부대의 전술행동과, 지휘부의 전략목표, 그리고 ‘국가의 전쟁지속 능력’이
복합적으로 균형있게 발휘되어야 승리를 보장할 수 있다.
● 이러한 측면에서 본다면, 현재 북한군은 ‘전면전’을 수행할 능력이 없다.
‘국가의 전쟁지속 능력’이 대한민국에 비하여 심하게 열세에 놓여있기 때문이다.
군수보급을 실시해야 하는 경제력과 손실된 병력을 지속적으로 충원해 줄 절대인구 수에서 특히 열세이다.
● 2014년 들어 중국이 대북한 원유수출을 공식적으로 중단한 것은 매우 시사적이다.
유류공급 중단이 북한이 ‘전면전’을 감행할 경우 북한군 기동장비의 기동력을 제한하기 때문이다.
한반도의 절대적 안정상황을 추구하는 중국의 대한반도 전략에 미루어 보아,
중국이 2014년 1월부터 북한에 유류공급을 중단한 것은
북한이 ‘2015 통일대전’을 감행할 가능성이 매우 높다고 판단하고, 대응조치로 실시한 것이 아닌가 생각한다.
● 이러한 점을 감수하고서라도, 북한이 ‘전면전’을 감행한다면,
전쟁의 양상은 ‘단기전’과 ‘생화학전’으로 전개될 가능성이 매우 높다.
(2) 북한의 병력부족 현상
● 북한 1990년 중반의 ‘고난의 행군’시절 당시 급격한 출산율 저하를 겪었다.
30여 년이 지난 현재 북한의 병력자원은 기존의 부대편제를 유지하기 힘들 정도이다.
● 이에 북한은 ‘현역 복무기간을 연장’하고 ‘여성의 의무복무’를 시행하는 등, 병력자원의 확보에 고심하고 있다.
북한이 ‘전면전’을 감행하면 ‘병력손실’은 당연한 것이고, 손실된 병력을 충원해야 하는데,
현재 북한의 인구의 연령대 별 분포를 감안하면
북한이 전장에 안정적으로 투입할 병력의 수가 충분하지 못함을 예측할 수 있다.
이러한 이유로 2월 11일 ‘노동적위대 지휘관 열성자 대회’가 열렸다고 보인다.
● 문제는 북한의 예비병력인 ‘노동적위대’와 ‘붉은청년근위대’가 과연 정규전을 수행할 수 있을 지 의문이다.
(3) 북한군이 보유한 재래식 화력의 취약성
● 북한군이 보유한 각종 포탄의 불량이 심각한 것은 주지의 사실이다.
● 현재 북한군은 각종 화포의 숫자 만 많을 뿐, 그 화포에 사용할 포탄의 심한 불량으로 전력의 누수가 있다.
2014년 11월 5일 NK지식인 연대가 보도한 북한군의 포탄 불량에 관한 기사의 내용은
북한군의 현실을 적나라하게 보여준다 하겠다.
4. 2015년 북한의 군사적 행동의 예측
● 북한 내부의 정치적 압력의 상승과 북한군 전력의 약화에 기인한 북한의 상황은
김정은과 북한군 지휘부에게 갈등과 어려운 선택을 강요하고 있다고 보인다.
재래식 전력의 열세로 ‘2015 통일대전’을 감행하기 어려우나,
정권유지 차원에서 감행하지 않을 수도 없는 상황이다.
1) 북한이 ‘2015 통일대전’을 감행하지 않을 경우
● 김정은과 북한군 지휘부는 정치적 해결을 시도할 것이다.
‘2015 통일대전’을 수행하지 못하는 치명적인 원인과 이유를 만들어
북한의 당.정.군부에 대규모의 숙청을 진행할 수 있다.
● 그리고 ‘2015 통일대전’을 수행하지 못한 책임을 김정은과 현 북한군 지휘부의 책임이 아닌
반당·반혁명세력 때문이라는 정치적 선전으로 군과 주민을 무마할 것이다.
이는 이미 6.25전쟁 후에 김일성이 써먹은 방법이다.
그러나 이 방법은 북한사회 전체에 심한 불안정성을 유발할 것이고 체제불안으로 확대될 수도 있다.
2) 북한이 ‘2015 통일대전’을 감행할 경우
● 북한이 ‘2015 통일대전’을 감행하려면 Trigger가 필요하다.
정찰 감시 장비가 발달한 현재전에서 전면적인 기습공격은 사실 불가능하다.
따라서 북한이 ‘전면전’을 감행한다면, 적절한 이유가 있어야 한다.
● 북한이 사용할 시나리오는 2가지가 가능하다.
☞ 시나리오 1.
핵실험 감행 ->대한민국의 반발과 국제사회 제재 ->
과거 2차례의 핵실험 시 처럼 북한의 통상적인 무력시위를 가장한 병력이동 -> 전면전
시나리오 2
핵실험 감행 -> 핵보유국 인정 요구 -> 국지전 도발 -> 핵 무기 사용 위협 ->대한민국의 정치적 굴복 강요 ->
국내 종북세력을 동원한 남남갈등 유발 (항전파와 굴복파) ->
군사적 통일이 아닌 정치적 통일을 성공했다고 북한 국내에 선전.
● 특히 시나리오 2에서는
북한이 핵실험 후 국지전을 도발은 서해도서를 점령하려고 시도할 가능성이 가장 높다.
서해도서를 점령한 후 대한민국이 북한의 강점을 인정하기 않을 경우 핵무기 사용를 사용하겠다고 위협할 경우
국내에 있는 종북세력은 ‘국민의 생명 & 재산 보호’, ‘핵전쟁 반대’ 등을 외치며
우리사회에 필요이상의 공포심을 조장할 가능성이 매우 크다.
5. 북한의 ‘2015 통일대전’에 대한 대응방안
1) 재래식 전력의 비교우위 강화
● 최근 방산업계의 비리문제로 자주국방의 기조가 흔들려서는 않된다.
방산장비의 지속적인 국산화와 재래식 전력의 강화가 이루어져야 한다.
이는 통일 후 동북아시아의 전력균형이라는 측면도 고려를 해야 하기 때문이다.
2) 생화학전에 대한 대비
● 정규군 만이 아니라 예비군과 일반국민 전체에 대한
화생방교육이 체계적으로 실시되고 최소한의 방호장비를 지급해야 한다.
● 사회의 불안을 조장할 수 있다는 비난이 두려워 준비를 못한다면 책임있는 자세가 아니다.
● 지방자치제는 제독차량과 전문요원을 준비해야 한다.
● 북한의 생화학전 능력과 생화학무기의 사용 가능성에 대해 국제적 여론을 지속적으로 환기해야 한다.
이는 북한이 생화학무기를 사용함에 심리적 부담을 주기 때문이다.
● 북한이 생화학무기 사용을 원천적으로 제한할 수 있는 ‘예방타격’을 위한 사전정보를 확보해야 한다.
생화학무기를 생산, 보관하는 장소와 생산자 신원 등을 확보하여야 한다.
● 북한이 생화학무기를 사용할 경우, 이에 대한 보복 수단을 확보해야 한다.
3) 비정규전 대비
● 북한이 사용 가능한 비정규전 전력은 두 종류이다.
하나는 정규군의 비정규전 부대이다.
이에 대해서는 국내외 언론에 많은 정보가 공개되었다.
둘째는 비정규군에 의한 비정규전이다.
즉 국내에 있는 북한의 고정간첩과 종북세력에 의한 사보타지 및 테러이다.
이들이 국가보안시설, 국가기간산업시설, 사회간접자본에 대한 테러를 감행할 경우 심각한 문제가 발생한다.
따라서 이에 대한 사전계획을 수립해야 한다.
♣ 결론
북한 내부의 정치 군사적 이유로 북한이 공표한 ‘2015 통일대전’의 발발 가능성은 높다고 보아야 한다.
북한의 2014년 군사행동의 특이 사항들이 이러한 예측에 무게감을 준다.
북한이 ‘2015 통일대전’을 감행한다면 전쟁의 양상은
‘비정규전’, ‘단기전’, ‘생화학전’으로 진행될 가능성이 매우 높다.
재래식 전력의 열세에 있는 북한이 선택할 수 있는 유일한 방법이기 때문이다.
이에 대한 국가적 차원의 준비가 필요하다.
필요하다면 국민들에게 정확한 정보를 제공하여 스스로 준비할 수 있도록 할 필요도 있다고 생각한다.
또한 생존권 측면에 ‘선제타격’의 당위성을 국제사회에 적극적으로 홍보하는 것도 필요하다고 생각한다.
[아침안개] 2014.11.17
2014년 11월 14일 금요일
慰安婦強制連行示す資料 法務省文書で確認＝日本市民団体
慰安婦強制連行示す資料 法務省文書で確認＝日本市民団体
旧日本軍が第２次世界大戦当時、慰安婦にするために女性を強制的に連行したという戦後の裁判記録を日本政府が調査し、内部報告を行っていたことが確認された。
軍や官憲による強制連行の事実を証明するものはないという安倍晋三内閣の主張とは異なるもので、今後論議を呼びそうだ。
聯合ニュースが１４日までに日本の市民団体で構成された「日本軍『慰安婦』問題解決全国行動」から確保した資料と、同団体の説明によると、法務省は軍事裁判でＢＣ級戦犯とされた戦犯の裁判記録から、慰安婦の強制連行があったという内容が収められた裁判記録を発見。
慰安婦問題への旧日本軍の関与を認めて謝罪した１９９３年の河野談話発表前に内閣官房に報告したという。
当時法務省は、第２次世界大戦時に旧日本軍がインドネシア・ジャワ島に設置した慰安所と関連した日本軍将校と軍務員など１０人に対する裁判記録を検討した後、「いわゆる従軍慰安婦問題の調査結果について」というＡ４用紙４枚の文書を作成した。
法務省は事件にかかわった日本軍少佐が、オランダ人女性が売春に応じないことを認識しながら、脅して売春を強要した事実が認められ、死刑の宣告を受けたと報告した。
判決は女性が自発的に慰安所で仕事をする前提で慰安所設置が許可されたため、女性を慰安婦として連行すれば条件違反だが、該当少佐がこれに配慮しなかったと判断した。
別の陸軍中将は部下や民間人が女性を抑留所から慰安所へ連行し、売春を強制するなど、戦争犯罪を行った事実を知っていた、また知ることができたにもかかわらず黙認したという理由で懲役１２年の判決を受けた。
法務省は判決文の内容を調査し、慰安所運営のために女性を連行し、抑圧することがあったことが確認されたと報告した。
法務省は、保管している裁判記録のほとんどが、裁判を行った国家から正式に入手したものではなく、被告人や遺族、弁護人などを通じて確保したものであり、原本資料との同一性が確認されなかったというただし書きを付けた。
同団体は法務省が作成した同報告書を情報公開請求により確保した。
同報告書は、安倍首相が第１次内閣当時の２００７年３月に、政府が発見した資料には軍や官憲による強制連行を直接示すような記述は発見されなかったとして、強制連行の存在を否定したことと矛盾するものであり、今後、議論になるものとみられる。
東京聯合ニュース. 2014/11/14 19:25
旧日本軍が第２次世界大戦当時、慰安婦にするために女性を強制的に連行したという戦後の裁判記録を日本政府が調査し、内部報告を行っていたことが確認された。
軍や官憲による強制連行の事実を証明するものはないという安倍晋三内閣の主張とは異なるもので、今後論議を呼びそうだ。
聯合ニュースが１４日までに日本の市民団体で構成された「日本軍『慰安婦』問題解決全国行動」から確保した資料と、同団体の説明によると、法務省は軍事裁判でＢＣ級戦犯とされた戦犯の裁判記録から、慰安婦の強制連行があったという内容が収められた裁判記録を発見。
慰安婦問題への旧日本軍の関与を認めて謝罪した１９９３年の河野談話発表前に内閣官房に報告したという。
当時法務省は、第２次世界大戦時に旧日本軍がインドネシア・ジャワ島に設置した慰安所と関連した日本軍将校と軍務員など１０人に対する裁判記録を検討した後、「いわゆる従軍慰安婦問題の調査結果について」というＡ４用紙４枚の文書を作成した。
法務省は事件にかかわった日本軍少佐が、オランダ人女性が売春に応じないことを認識しながら、脅して売春を強要した事実が認められ、死刑の宣告を受けたと報告した。
判決は女性が自発的に慰安所で仕事をする前提で慰安所設置が許可されたため、女性を慰安婦として連行すれば条件違反だが、該当少佐がこれに配慮しなかったと判断した。
別の陸軍中将は部下や民間人が女性を抑留所から慰安所へ連行し、売春を強制するなど、戦争犯罪を行った事実を知っていた、また知ることができたにもかかわらず黙認したという理由で懲役１２年の判決を受けた。
法務省は判決文の内容を調査し、慰安所運営のために女性を連行し、抑圧することがあったことが確認されたと報告した。
法務省は、保管している裁判記録のほとんどが、裁判を行った国家から正式に入手したものではなく、被告人や遺族、弁護人などを通じて確保したものであり、原本資料との同一性が確認されなかったというただし書きを付けた。
同団体は法務省が作成した同報告書を情報公開請求により確保した。
同報告書は、安倍首相が第１次内閣当時の２００７年３月に、政府が発見した資料には軍や官憲による強制連行を直接示すような記述は発見されなかったとして、強制連行の存在を否定したことと矛盾するものであり、今後、議論になるものとみられる。
東京聯合ニュース. 2014/11/14 19:25
2014년 11월 8일 토요일
W80-1 Warhead Selected For New Nuclear Cruise Missile
W80-1 Warhead Selected For New Nuclear Cruise Missile
Was the United States Air Force right to select the W80-1 warhead for its new nuclear-capable cruise missile?
Not according to Hans Kristensen.
He thinks that the enormous cost of this weapon will deprive America’s military of more essential conventional capabilities.
By Hans M. Kristensen for Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
-----------------------------------------------
This article was originally published by the Federation of American Scientists on 10 October 2014.
The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council has selected the W80-1 thermonuclear warhead for the Air Force’s new nuclear cruise missile (Long-Range Standoff, LRSO) scheduled for deployment in 2027.
The W80-1 warhead is currently used on the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), but will be modified during a life-extension program and de-deployed with a new name: W80-4.
Under current plans, the ALCM will be retired in the mid-2020s and replaced with the more advanced LRSO, possibly starting in 2027.
The enormous cost of the program – $10-20 billion by some estimates – is robbing defense planners of resources needed for more important non-nuclear capabilities.
Even though the United States has thousands of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles and is building a new penetrating bomber to deliver nuclear bombs, STRATCOM and Air Force leaders are arguing that a new nuclear cruise missile is needed as well.
But their description of the LRSO mission sounds a lot like old-fashioned nuclear warfighting that will add new military capabilities to the arsenal in conflict with the administration’s promise not to do so and reduce the role of nuclear weapons.
What Kind of Warhead?
The selection of the W80-1 warhead for the LRSO completes a multi-year process that also considered using the B61 and W84 warheads.
The W80-4 selected for the LRSO will be the fifth modification name for the W80 warhead (see table below): The first was the W80-0 for the Navy’s Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM/N), which was retired in 2011; the second is the W80-1, which is still used the ALCM; the third was the W80-2, which was a planned LEP of the W80-0 but canceled in 2006; the fourth was the W80-3, a planned LEP of the W80-1 but canceled in 2006.
The B61 warhead has been used as the basis for a wide variety of warhead designs.
It currently exists in five gravity bomb versions (B61-4, B61-4, B61-7, B61-10, B61-11) and was also used as the basis for the W85 warhead on the Pershing II ground-launched ballistic missile.
After the Pershing II was eliminated by the INF Treaty, the W85 was converted into the B61-10.
But the B61 was not selected for the LRSO partly because of concern about the risk of common-component failure from basing too many warheads on the same basic design.
The W84 was developed for the ground-launched cruise missile (BGM-109G), another weapon eliminated by the INF Treaty.
As a more modern warhead, it includes a Fire Resistant Pit (which the W80-1 does not have) and a more advanced Permissive Action Link (PAL) use-control system.
The W84 was retired from the stockpile in 2008 but was brought back as a LRSO candidate but was not selected, partly because not enough W84s were built to meet the requirement for the planned LRSO inventory.
Cost Estimates
In the past two year, NNSA has provided two very different cost estimates for the W80-4.
The FY2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) published in June 2013 projected a total cost of approximately $11.6 billion through 2030.
The FY2015 SSMP, in contrast, contained a significantly lower estimate: approximately $6.8 billion through 2033 (see graph below).
The huge difference in the cost estimates (nearly 50%) is not explained in detail in the FY2015 SSMP, which only states that the FY2014 numbers were updated with a smaller “escalation factor” and “improvements in the cost models.”
Curiously, the update only reduces the cost for the years that were particularly high (2019-2027), the years with warhead development and production engineering.
The two-third reduction in the cost estimate may make it easier for NNSA to secure Congressional funding, but it also raises significant uncertainty about what the cost will actually be.
Assuming a planned production of approximately 500 LRSOs (there are currently 528 ALCMs in the stockpile and the New START Treaty does not count or limit cruise missiles), the cost estimates indicate a complex W80-4 LEP on par with the B61-12 LEP. NNSA told me the plan is to use many of the non-nuclear components and technologies on the W80-4 that were developed for the B61-12.
In addition to the cost of the W80-4 warhead itself, the cost estimate for completing the LRSO has not been announced but $227 million are programmed through 2019.
Unofficial estimates put the total cost for the LRSO and W80-4 at $10-20 billion.
In addition to these weapons costs, integration on the B-2A and next-generation long-range bomber (LRS-B) will add hundreds of millions more.
What’s The Mission?
Why does the Air Force need a new nuclear cruise missile?
During a recent meeting with Pentagon officials, I asked why the LRSO was needed, given that the military also has gravity bombs on its bombers.
“Because of what you see on that map,” a senior defense official said pointing to a large world map on the wall.
The implication was that many targets would be risky to get to with a bomber.
When reminded that the military also has land- and sea-based ballistic missiles that can reach all of those targets, another official explained:
“Yes but they’re all brute weapons with high-yield warheads. We need the targeting flexibility and lower-yield options that the LRSO provides.”
The assumption for the argument is that if the Air Force didn’t have a nuclear cruise missile, an adversary could gamble that the United States would not risk an expensive stealth bomber to deliver a nuclear bomb and would not want to use ballistic missiles because that would be escalating too much.
That’s quite an assumption but for the nuclear warfighter the cruise missile is seen as this great in-between weapon that increases targeting flexibility in a variety of regional strike scenarios.
That conversation could have taken place back in the 1980s because the answers sounded more like warfighting talk than deterrence.
The two roles can be hard to differentiate and the Air Force’s budget request seems to include a bit of both: the LRSO “will be capable of penetrating and surviving advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) from significant stand off range to prosecute strategic targets in support of the Air Force’s global attack capability and strategic deterrence core function.”
The deterrence function is provided by the existence of the weapon, but the global attack capability is what’s needed when deterrence fails.
At that point, the mission is about target destruction: holding at risk what the adversary values most.
Getting to the target is harder with a cruise missile than a ballistic missile, but it is easier with a cruise missile than a gravity bomb because the latter requires the bomber to fly very close to the target.
That exposes the platform to all sorts of air defense capabilities.
That’s why the Pentagon plans to spend a lot of money on equipping its next-generation long-range bomber (LRS-B) with low-observable technology.
The LRSO is therefore needed, STRATCOM commander Admiral Cecil Haney explained in June, to “effectively conduct global strike operations in the anti-access, access-denial environments.”
When asked why they needed a standoff missile when they were building a stealth bomber, Haney acknowledge that “if you had all the stealth you could possibly have in a platform, then gravity bombs would solve it all.”
But the stealth of the bomber will diminish over time because of countermeasures invented by adversaries, he warned.
So “having standoff and stealth is very important” given how long the long-range bomber will operate into the future.
Still, one could say that for any weapon and it doesn’t really explain what the nuclear mission is.
But around the same time Admiral Haney made his statement, Air Force Global Strike Command commander General Wilson added a bit more texture: “There may be air defenses that are just too hard, it’s so redundant, that penetrating bombers become a challenge. But with standoff, I can make holes and gaps to allow a penetrating bomber to get in, and then it becomes a matter of balance.”
In this mission, the LRSO would not be used to keep the stealth bomber out of harms way per ce but as a nuclear sledgehammer to “kick down the door” so the bomber – potentially with B61-12 nuclear bombs in its bomb bay – could slip through the air defenses and get to its targets inside the country.
Rather than deterrence, this is a real warfighting scenario that is a central element of STRATCOM’s Global Strike mission for the first few days of a conflict and includes a mix of weapons such as the B-2, F-22, and standoff weapons.
But why the sledgehammer mission would require a nuclear cruise missile is still not clear, as conventional cruise missiles have become significantly more capable against air defense and hard targets.
In fact, most of the Global Strike scenarios would involve conventional weapons, not nuclear LRSOs.
The Air Force has a $4 billion program underway to develop the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and an extended-range version (JASSM-ER) for deliver by B-1B, B-2A, B-52H bombers and F-15E, F-16, and F-35 fighters.
A total of 4,900 missiles are planned, including 2,846 JASSM-ERs.
Since the next-generation long-range bomber would also be the launch platform for those conventional weapons, it will be exposed to the same risks with or without a nuclear LRSO.
Most recently, according to the Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor, Gen. Wilson added another twist to the justification:
“If I take a bomber, and I put standoff cruise missiles on it, in essence, it becomes very much like a sub. It’s got close to the same magazine capacity of a sub. So once I generate a bomber with standoff cruise missiles, it becomes a significant deterrent for any adversary. We often forget that. It possesses the same firepower, in essence, as a sub that we can position whenever and wherever we want, and it becomes a very strong deterrent. So I’m a strong proponent of being able to modernize our standoff missile capability.”
Although the claim that a bomber has “close to the same capacity of a sub” is vastly exaggerated (it is up to 20 warheads on 20 cruise missiles on a B-52H bomber versus 192 warheads on 24 sea-launched ballistic missiles on an Ohio-class submarine), the example helps illustrates the enormous overcapacity and redundancy in the current arsenal.
What Kind of Missile?
Although we have yet to see what kind of capabilities the LRSO will have, the Air Force description is that LRSO “will be capable of penetrating and surviving advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) from significant stand off range to prosecute strategic targets in support of the Air Force’s global attack capability and strategic deterrence core function.”
There is every reason to expect that STRATCOM and the Air Force will want the weapon to have better military capabilities than the current Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), perhaps with features similar to the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM).
After all, so the thinking goes, air defenses have improved significantly since the ALCM was deployed in 1982 and the LRSO will have to operate well into the middle of the century when air defense systems can be expected to be even better than today.
With a 3,000-km range similar to the ACM, the LRSO would theoretically be able to reach targets in much of Russia and most of China from launch-positions 1,000 kilometers from their coasts. Most of Russia and China’s nuclear forces are located in these areas.
In thinking about which capabilities would be needed for the LRSO, it is useful to recall the last time the warfighters argued that an improved cruise missile was needed.
The ALCM was also “designed to evade air and ground-based defenses in order to strike targets at any location within any enemy’s territory,” but that was not good enough. So the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) was developed and deployed in 1992 to provide “significant improvements” over the ALCM in “range, accuracy, and survivability.”
The rest of the mission was similar – “evade air and ground-based defenses in order to strike heavily defended, hardened targets at any location within any enemy’s territory” – but the requirement to hold at risk “heavily defended, hardened targets” was unique.
Yet when comparing the ALCM and ACM mission requirements and capabilities with the operational experience, GAO in 1993 found that “air defense threats had been overestimated” and that “tests did not demonstrate low ALCM survivability.” The ACM’s range was found to be “only slightly better than the older ALCM’s demonstrated capability,” and GAO concluded that “the improvement in accuracy offered by the ACM appears to have little real operational significance.”
Nonetheless, the ACM was produced in 1992-1993 at a cost of more than $10 billion. Strategic Air Command initially wanted 1461 missiles, but the high cost and the end of the Cold War caused Pentagon to cut the program to only 430 missiles.
target kill capability with the W80-1 warhead, the ACM was designed for external carriage on the B-52H bomber, with up to 12 missiles under the wings.
The B-2 was also capable of carrying the ACM but as a penetrating stealth bomber there was never a need to assign it the stealthy standoff missile as well.
The ACM was supposed to undergo a life extension program to extend it to 2030, but after only 15 years of service the missile was retired early in 2007.
An Enhanced Cruise Missile (ECM) was planned by the Bush administration, but it never materialized.
It is likely, but still not clear, that LRSO will make use of some of the technologies from the ACM and ECM programs.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The W80-1 warhead has been selected to arm the new Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile, a $10-20 billion weapon system the Air Force plans to deploy in the late-2020s but can poorly afford.
Even though the United States has thousands of nuclear warheads on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles that can reach the same targets intended for the LRSO, the military argues that a new nuclear standoff weapon is needed to spare a new penetrating bomber from enemy air-defense threats.
Yet the same bomber will be also equipped with conventional weapons – some standoff, some not – that will expose it to the same kinds of threats anyway.
So the claim that the LRSO is needed to spare the next-generation bomber from air-defense threats sounds a bit like a straw man argument.
The mission for the LRSO is vague at best and to the extent the Air Force has described one it sounds like a warfighting mission from the Cold War with nuclear cruise missiles shooting holes in enemy air defense systems.
Given the conventional weapon systems that have been developed over the past two decades, it is highly questionable whether such a mission requires a nuclear cruise missile.
The warfighters and the strategists might want a nuclear cruise missile as a flexible weapon for regional scenarios.
But good to have is not the same as essential. And the regional scenarios they use to justify it are vague and largely unknown – certainly untested – in the public debate.
In the nuclear force structure planned for the future, the United States will have roughly 1,500 warheads deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles.
Nearly three-quarters of those warheads will be onboard submarines that can move to positions off adversaries anywhere in the world and launch missiles that can put warheads on target in as little as 15 minutes.
It really stretches the imagination why such a capability, backed up by nuclear bombs on bombers and the enormous conventional capability the U.S. military possesses, would be insufficient to deter or dissuade any potential adversary that can be deterred or dissuaded.
As the number of warheads deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles continues to drop in the future, long-range, highly accurate, stealthy, standoff cruise missiles will increasingly complicate the situation.
These weapons are not counted under the New START treaty and if a follow-on treaty does not succeed in limiting them, which seems unlikely in the current political climate, a new round of nuclear cruise missile deployments could become real spoilers.
There are currently more ALCMs than ICBMs in the U.S. arsenal and with each bomber capable of loading up to 20 missiles the rapid upload capacity is considerable.
Under the 1,500 deployed strategic warhead posture of the New START treaty, the unaccounted cruise missiles could very quickly increase the force by one-third to 2,000 warheads.
Under a posture of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, which the Obama administration has proposed for the future, the effect would be even more dramatic: the air-launched cruise missiles could quickly increase the number of deployed warheads by 50 percent. Not good for crisis stability!
As things stand at the moment, the only real argument for the new cruise missile seems to be that the Air Force currently has one, but it’s getting old, so it needs a new one.
Add to that the fact that Russia is also developing a new cruise missile, and all clear thinking about whether the LRSO is needed seems to fly out the window.
Rather than automatically developing and deploying a new nuclear cruise missile, the administration and Congress need to ask tough questions about the need for the LRSO and whether the money could be better spent elsewhere on non-nuclear capabilities that – unlike a nuclear cruise missile – are actually useful in supporting U.S. national and international security commitments.
For more information on issues and events that shape our world, please visit the ISN Blog or browse our resources.
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Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists where he provides the public with analysis and background information about the status of nuclear forces and the role of nuclear weapons.
He specializes in using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in his research and is a frequent consultant to and is widely referenced in the news media on the role and status of nuclear weapons.
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Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
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Copyright
Not according to Hans Kristensen.
He thinks that the enormous cost of this weapon will deprive America’s military of more essential conventional capabilities.
By Hans M. Kristensen for Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
-----------------------------------------------
This article was originally published by the Federation of American Scientists on 10 October 2014.
The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council has selected the W80-1 thermonuclear warhead for the Air Force’s new nuclear cruise missile (Long-Range Standoff, LRSO) scheduled for deployment in 2027.
The W80-1 warhead is currently used on the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), but will be modified during a life-extension program and de-deployed with a new name: W80-4.
Under current plans, the ALCM will be retired in the mid-2020s and replaced with the more advanced LRSO, possibly starting in 2027.
The enormous cost of the program – $10-20 billion by some estimates – is robbing defense planners of resources needed for more important non-nuclear capabilities.
Even though the United States has thousands of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles and is building a new penetrating bomber to deliver nuclear bombs, STRATCOM and Air Force leaders are arguing that a new nuclear cruise missile is needed as well.
But their description of the LRSO mission sounds a lot like old-fashioned nuclear warfighting that will add new military capabilities to the arsenal in conflict with the administration’s promise not to do so and reduce the role of nuclear weapons.
What Kind of Warhead?
The selection of the W80-1 warhead for the LRSO completes a multi-year process that also considered using the B61 and W84 warheads.
The W80-4 selected for the LRSO will be the fifth modification name for the W80 warhead (see table below): The first was the W80-0 for the Navy’s Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM/N), which was retired in 2011; the second is the W80-1, which is still used the ALCM; the third was the W80-2, which was a planned LEP of the W80-0 but canceled in 2006; the fourth was the W80-3, a planned LEP of the W80-1 but canceled in 2006.
It currently exists in five gravity bomb versions (B61-4, B61-4, B61-7, B61-10, B61-11) and was also used as the basis for the W85 warhead on the Pershing II ground-launched ballistic missile.
After the Pershing II was eliminated by the INF Treaty, the W85 was converted into the B61-10.
But the B61 was not selected for the LRSO partly because of concern about the risk of common-component failure from basing too many warheads on the same basic design.
The W84 was developed for the ground-launched cruise missile (BGM-109G), another weapon eliminated by the INF Treaty.
As a more modern warhead, it includes a Fire Resistant Pit (which the W80-1 does not have) and a more advanced Permissive Action Link (PAL) use-control system.
The W84 was retired from the stockpile in 2008 but was brought back as a LRSO candidate but was not selected, partly because not enough W84s were built to meet the requirement for the planned LRSO inventory.
Cost Estimates
In the past two year, NNSA has provided two very different cost estimates for the W80-4.
The FY2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) published in June 2013 projected a total cost of approximately $11.6 billion through 2030.
The FY2015 SSMP, in contrast, contained a significantly lower estimate: approximately $6.8 billion through 2033 (see graph below).
Curiously, the update only reduces the cost for the years that were particularly high (2019-2027), the years with warhead development and production engineering.
The two-third reduction in the cost estimate may make it easier for NNSA to secure Congressional funding, but it also raises significant uncertainty about what the cost will actually be.
Assuming a planned production of approximately 500 LRSOs (there are currently 528 ALCMs in the stockpile and the New START Treaty does not count or limit cruise missiles), the cost estimates indicate a complex W80-4 LEP on par with the B61-12 LEP. NNSA told me the plan is to use many of the non-nuclear components and technologies on the W80-4 that were developed for the B61-12.
In addition to the cost of the W80-4 warhead itself, the cost estimate for completing the LRSO has not been announced but $227 million are programmed through 2019.
Unofficial estimates put the total cost for the LRSO and W80-4 at $10-20 billion.
In addition to these weapons costs, integration on the B-2A and next-generation long-range bomber (LRS-B) will add hundreds of millions more.
What’s The Mission?
Why does the Air Force need a new nuclear cruise missile?
During a recent meeting with Pentagon officials, I asked why the LRSO was needed, given that the military also has gravity bombs on its bombers.
“Because of what you see on that map,” a senior defense official said pointing to a large world map on the wall.
The implication was that many targets would be risky to get to with a bomber.
When reminded that the military also has land- and sea-based ballistic missiles that can reach all of those targets, another official explained:
“Yes but they’re all brute weapons with high-yield warheads. We need the targeting flexibility and lower-yield options that the LRSO provides.”
The assumption for the argument is that if the Air Force didn’t have a nuclear cruise missile, an adversary could gamble that the United States would not risk an expensive stealth bomber to deliver a nuclear bomb and would not want to use ballistic missiles because that would be escalating too much.
That’s quite an assumption but for the nuclear warfighter the cruise missile is seen as this great in-between weapon that increases targeting flexibility in a variety of regional strike scenarios.
That conversation could have taken place back in the 1980s because the answers sounded more like warfighting talk than deterrence.
The two roles can be hard to differentiate and the Air Force’s budget request seems to include a bit of both: the LRSO “will be capable of penetrating and surviving advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) from significant stand off range to prosecute strategic targets in support of the Air Force’s global attack capability and strategic deterrence core function.”
The deterrence function is provided by the existence of the weapon, but the global attack capability is what’s needed when deterrence fails.
At that point, the mission is about target destruction: holding at risk what the adversary values most.
Getting to the target is harder with a cruise missile than a ballistic missile, but it is easier with a cruise missile than a gravity bomb because the latter requires the bomber to fly very close to the target.
That exposes the platform to all sorts of air defense capabilities.
That’s why the Pentagon plans to spend a lot of money on equipping its next-generation long-range bomber (LRS-B) with low-observable technology.
The LRSO is therefore needed, STRATCOM commander Admiral Cecil Haney explained in June, to “effectively conduct global strike operations in the anti-access, access-denial environments.”
When asked why they needed a standoff missile when they were building a stealth bomber, Haney acknowledge that “if you had all the stealth you could possibly have in a platform, then gravity bombs would solve it all.”
But the stealth of the bomber will diminish over time because of countermeasures invented by adversaries, he warned.
So “having standoff and stealth is very important” given how long the long-range bomber will operate into the future.
Still, one could say that for any weapon and it doesn’t really explain what the nuclear mission is.
But around the same time Admiral Haney made his statement, Air Force Global Strike Command commander General Wilson added a bit more texture: “There may be air defenses that are just too hard, it’s so redundant, that penetrating bombers become a challenge. But with standoff, I can make holes and gaps to allow a penetrating bomber to get in, and then it becomes a matter of balance.”
In this mission, the LRSO would not be used to keep the stealth bomber out of harms way per ce but as a nuclear sledgehammer to “kick down the door” so the bomber – potentially with B61-12 nuclear bombs in its bomb bay – could slip through the air defenses and get to its targets inside the country.
Rather than deterrence, this is a real warfighting scenario that is a central element of STRATCOM’s Global Strike mission for the first few days of a conflict and includes a mix of weapons such as the B-2, F-22, and standoff weapons.
But why the sledgehammer mission would require a nuclear cruise missile is still not clear, as conventional cruise missiles have become significantly more capable against air defense and hard targets.
In fact, most of the Global Strike scenarios would involve conventional weapons, not nuclear LRSOs.
The Air Force has a $4 billion program underway to develop the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and an extended-range version (JASSM-ER) for deliver by B-1B, B-2A, B-52H bombers and F-15E, F-16, and F-35 fighters.
A total of 4,900 missiles are planned, including 2,846 JASSM-ERs.
Since the next-generation long-range bomber would also be the launch platform for those conventional weapons, it will be exposed to the same risks with or without a nuclear LRSO.
Most recently, according to the Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor, Gen. Wilson added another twist to the justification:
“If I take a bomber, and I put standoff cruise missiles on it, in essence, it becomes very much like a sub. It’s got close to the same magazine capacity of a sub. So once I generate a bomber with standoff cruise missiles, it becomes a significant deterrent for any adversary. We often forget that. It possesses the same firepower, in essence, as a sub that we can position whenever and wherever we want, and it becomes a very strong deterrent. So I’m a strong proponent of being able to modernize our standoff missile capability.”
Although the claim that a bomber has “close to the same capacity of a sub” is vastly exaggerated (it is up to 20 warheads on 20 cruise missiles on a B-52H bomber versus 192 warheads on 24 sea-launched ballistic missiles on an Ohio-class submarine), the example helps illustrates the enormous overcapacity and redundancy in the current arsenal.
What Kind of Missile?
Although we have yet to see what kind of capabilities the LRSO will have, the Air Force description is that LRSO “will be capable of penetrating and surviving advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) from significant stand off range to prosecute strategic targets in support of the Air Force’s global attack capability and strategic deterrence core function.”
There is every reason to expect that STRATCOM and the Air Force will want the weapon to have better military capabilities than the current Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), perhaps with features similar to the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM).
After all, so the thinking goes, air defenses have improved significantly since the ALCM was deployed in 1982 and the LRSO will have to operate well into the middle of the century when air defense systems can be expected to be even better than today.
With a 3,000-km range similar to the ACM, the LRSO would theoretically be able to reach targets in much of Russia and most of China from launch-positions 1,000 kilometers from their coasts. Most of Russia and China’s nuclear forces are located in these areas.
In thinking about which capabilities would be needed for the LRSO, it is useful to recall the last time the warfighters argued that an improved cruise missile was needed.
The ALCM was also “designed to evade air and ground-based defenses in order to strike targets at any location within any enemy’s territory,” but that was not good enough. So the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) was developed and deployed in 1992 to provide “significant improvements” over the ALCM in “range, accuracy, and survivability.”
The rest of the mission was similar – “evade air and ground-based defenses in order to strike heavily defended, hardened targets at any location within any enemy’s territory” – but the requirement to hold at risk “heavily defended, hardened targets” was unique.
Yet when comparing the ALCM and ACM mission requirements and capabilities with the operational experience, GAO in 1993 found that “air defense threats had been overestimated” and that “tests did not demonstrate low ALCM survivability.” The ACM’s range was found to be “only slightly better than the older ALCM’s demonstrated capability,” and GAO concluded that “the improvement in accuracy offered by the ACM appears to have little real operational significance.”
Nonetheless, the ACM was produced in 1992-1993 at a cost of more than $10 billion. Strategic Air Command initially wanted 1461 missiles, but the high cost and the end of the Cold War caused Pentagon to cut the program to only 430 missiles.
target kill capability with the W80-1 warhead, the ACM was designed for external carriage on the B-52H bomber, with up to 12 missiles under the wings.
The B-2 was also capable of carrying the ACM but as a penetrating stealth bomber there was never a need to assign it the stealthy standoff missile as well.
The ACM was supposed to undergo a life extension program to extend it to 2030, but after only 15 years of service the missile was retired early in 2007.
An Enhanced Cruise Missile (ECM) was planned by the Bush administration, but it never materialized.
It is likely, but still not clear, that LRSO will make use of some of the technologies from the ACM and ECM programs.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The W80-1 warhead has been selected to arm the new Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile, a $10-20 billion weapon system the Air Force plans to deploy in the late-2020s but can poorly afford.
Even though the United States has thousands of nuclear warheads on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles that can reach the same targets intended for the LRSO, the military argues that a new nuclear standoff weapon is needed to spare a new penetrating bomber from enemy air-defense threats.
Yet the same bomber will be also equipped with conventional weapons – some standoff, some not – that will expose it to the same kinds of threats anyway.
So the claim that the LRSO is needed to spare the next-generation bomber from air-defense threats sounds a bit like a straw man argument.
The mission for the LRSO is vague at best and to the extent the Air Force has described one it sounds like a warfighting mission from the Cold War with nuclear cruise missiles shooting holes in enemy air defense systems.
Given the conventional weapon systems that have been developed over the past two decades, it is highly questionable whether such a mission requires a nuclear cruise missile.
The warfighters and the strategists might want a nuclear cruise missile as a flexible weapon for regional scenarios.
But good to have is not the same as essential. And the regional scenarios they use to justify it are vague and largely unknown – certainly untested – in the public debate.
In the nuclear force structure planned for the future, the United States will have roughly 1,500 warheads deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles.
Nearly three-quarters of those warheads will be onboard submarines that can move to positions off adversaries anywhere in the world and launch missiles that can put warheads on target in as little as 15 minutes.
It really stretches the imagination why such a capability, backed up by nuclear bombs on bombers and the enormous conventional capability the U.S. military possesses, would be insufficient to deter or dissuade any potential adversary that can be deterred or dissuaded.
As the number of warheads deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles continues to drop in the future, long-range, highly accurate, stealthy, standoff cruise missiles will increasingly complicate the situation.
These weapons are not counted under the New START treaty and if a follow-on treaty does not succeed in limiting them, which seems unlikely in the current political climate, a new round of nuclear cruise missile deployments could become real spoilers.
There are currently more ALCMs than ICBMs in the U.S. arsenal and with each bomber capable of loading up to 20 missiles the rapid upload capacity is considerable.
Under the 1,500 deployed strategic warhead posture of the New START treaty, the unaccounted cruise missiles could very quickly increase the force by one-third to 2,000 warheads.
Under a posture of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads, which the Obama administration has proposed for the future, the effect would be even more dramatic: the air-launched cruise missiles could quickly increase the number of deployed warheads by 50 percent. Not good for crisis stability!
As things stand at the moment, the only real argument for the new cruise missile seems to be that the Air Force currently has one, but it’s getting old, so it needs a new one.
Add to that the fact that Russia is also developing a new cruise missile, and all clear thinking about whether the LRSO is needed seems to fly out the window.
Rather than automatically developing and deploying a new nuclear cruise missile, the administration and Congress need to ask tough questions about the need for the LRSO and whether the money could be better spent elsewhere on non-nuclear capabilities that – unlike a nuclear cruise missile – are actually useful in supporting U.S. national and international security commitments.
For more information on issues and events that shape our world, please visit the ISN Blog or browse our resources.
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Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists where he provides the public with analysis and background information about the status of nuclear forces and the role of nuclear weapons.
He specializes in using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in his research and is a frequent consultant to and is widely referenced in the news media on the role and status of nuclear weapons.
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Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
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Copyright
2014년 10월 18일 토요일
Russia Sends First Fighter Jets to Belarus Base
MOSCOW, December 9 (RIA Novosti) – A Russian fighter jet unit has arrived at a Belarusian airbase where it will be stationed on alert duty as part of an integrated regional air defense network, Belarusian news agency BelaPAN reported.
Four Russian Air Force Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker fighter jets and technical personnel have been based at the Baranovichi airbase, BelaPAN said on Sunday.
The Russian Defense Ministry recently announced plans to deploy a fighter jet regiment in Belarus by 2015.
The majority of the planes will be stationed at a future Russian airbase in Lida, a town in northwestern Belarus, near the Polish and Lithuanian borders.
The airbase will be Russia’s first on Belarusian territory in modern times and will consolidate defense cooperation under the auspices of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, defense officials in Moscow have said.
European defense officials have bristled at evidence of Russia’s increased military deployments close to NATO’s border, claiming it fuels tension with former Communist bloc countries in Central Europe and the Baltic States.
But Moscow has repeatedly said Russian-Belarus defense ties are a legitimate effort to ensure a solid defense for the countries’ Union State.
Russia and Belarus signed an agreement on the joint protection of the Union State's airspace and the creation of an integrated regional air defense network in February 2009.
The network reportedly comprises five air force units, 10 air defense units, five technical service and support units, and one electronic warfare unit.
It is part of the integrated air defense network of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose alliance comprising nine post-Soviet nations.
2014년 10월 12일 일요일
Engine issues mean China can't power J-15, J-16 fighters
according to the Moscow-based Military-Industrial Courier on Sept. 8.
According to Kanwa Defense Review,
a magazine operated by military analyst Andrei Chang,
also known as Pinkov, China is not even capable of producing J-11B fighters due to
problems with Shenyang Liming Aircraft Engine Company's WS-10A engine.
Similar problems led the People's Liberation Army Navy to cancel their plans
to install the WS-10A in the J-15, a carrier-based fighter designed to serve aboard the Liaoning, China's first aircraft carrier.
Both the PLA Air Force and Navy Air Force have asked to replace the WS-10A with the more reliable Russian-built AL-31F engines, the magazine stated.
China is unlikely to get enough AL-31F engines to power all of its J-15 and J-16 fighters when production starts on the aircraft however.
The only option left for China is to stop producing more advanced fighters until it is capable of designing the engines the aircraft need.
Sources from the Chinese aviation industry told the Military-Industrial Courier that the PLA is losing its patience with the WS-10A engines.
Without proper competition among state-run engine producers, the source said that China is unable to design the engines it needs to power its new aircraft.
The Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China suggested that the PLA Air Force use domestic engines anyway to boost the economy.
[Want China.com] Staff Reporter.2014-09-09
2014년 10월 9일 목요일
South Korea-Indonesia sign up for next phase of KFX programme
South Korea-Indonesia sign up for next phase of KFX programme
South Korea and Indonesia have signed a joint engineering and development agreement for the Korean Fighter Experimental (KFX) 4.5-generation fighter, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration in Seoul announced on 6 October.
The agreement, which was signed in Surabaya by South Korean ambassador to Indonesia Cho Tai-young and Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, follows up a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed in July 2010 and an April 2011 agreement that covered the initial two-year technical development phase of the programme.
Under the arrangement announced on 6 October, South Korea will pay 80% of the costs associated with the joint engineering and development phase of the KFX, with Indonesia paying the remaining 20%.
Officials from lead manufacturer Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) have previously described the KFX as a single-seat, twin-engine, multirole aircraft equipped with stealth features, active electronically scanned array radar, and internal weapons carriage.
Under the 2010 MoU, Indonesian company PT Dirgantara will participate in the aircraft's development.
KAI officials have suggested that around 250 KFX combat aircraft could replace the Republic of Korea Air Force's ageing F-4E Phantom and F-5E Tiger II aircraft, and ultimately its F-16 Fighting Falcon platforms. A further 350 KFX aircraft could be exported, officials added.
The 6 October agreement calls for the establishment of a joint programme management office "to reduce the financial burden required to jointly develop the fighter by enhancing co-operation in design, prototype fabrication, test, and evaluation." Yonhap news agency put the total development cost at KRW8.5 trillion (USD8 billion): a significant increase on the USD5 billion quoted by officials in 2011 and more the KRW8 trillion quoted by KAI officials in January 2014.
COMMENT
Political concerns at the potential financial risks associated with the KFX led KAI to develop a single-engined version, dubbed the C501, that combined elements of the in-production FA-50 light fighter and the twin-engine KFX technology demonstrator, dubbed the C103. This was partly in response to a decision by the new South Korean government of President Park Geun-hye to suspend the KFX/IFX programme in early 2013.
However, in July 2014 the RoCAF and the Ministry of National Defense confirmed that KFX programme would go ahead with the twin-engine C103 design, technical development of which was completed in 2013.
Another key element of the KFX programme will be the involvement of Lockheed Martin, which has agreed to provide technical support for under the terms of the RoCAF's purchase of 40 F-35s under the FX-III acquisition. The arrangement is similar to the offsets that were agreed as part of Seoul's purchase of KF-16s: technology transfer that led directly to the development of the T-50 Golden Eagle lead-in fighter trainer and its derivatives.
A Lockheed Martin spokesman told IHS Jane's on 25 September that the F-35 deal's offset commitment would include "technical documentation, design expertise, and development investments. Specifically, Lockheed Martin will provide several hundred man-years of engineering expertise to assist Korea in the KFX design and development."
"Lockheed Martin will also provide several hundred-thousand pages of fighter aircraft technical documentation derived from existing Lockheed Martin programmes," the spokesman added.
From Jakarta's perspective, the KFX deal is the latest example of close military industrial ties with a country that has become an important supplier of - and market for - military equipment.
Indonesia is receiving 16 T-50 LIFT aircraft and Black Fox military vehicles produced by Doosan DST. South Korea's Daewoo Marine & Shipbuilding Engineering (DSME) has upgraded two Indonesian Cakra Type 209/1300-class submarines in South Korea and in December 2011 received a contract to supply three Chang Bogo-class Type 209/1200 diesel-electric attack submarines to the Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut: TNI-AL).
For its part, Seoul has ordered eight licence-produced CN235 aircraft from PTDI for the RoCAF and four maritime patrol variants for its coastguard.
[IHS Jane's Defence Weekly ] by James Hardy, London/07 October 2014
South Korea and Indonesia have signed a joint engineering and development agreement for the Korean Fighter Experimental (KFX) 4.5-generation fighter, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration in Seoul announced on 6 October.
The agreement, which was signed in Surabaya by South Korean ambassador to Indonesia Cho Tai-young and Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, follows up a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed in July 2010 and an April 2011 agreement that covered the initial two-year technical development phase of the programme.
Under the arrangement announced on 6 October, South Korea will pay 80% of the costs associated with the joint engineering and development phase of the KFX, with Indonesia paying the remaining 20%.
Officials from lead manufacturer Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) have previously described the KFX as a single-seat, twin-engine, multirole aircraft equipped with stealth features, active electronically scanned array radar, and internal weapons carriage.
Under the 2010 MoU, Indonesian company PT Dirgantara will participate in the aircraft's development.
KAI officials have suggested that around 250 KFX combat aircraft could replace the Republic of Korea Air Force's ageing F-4E Phantom and F-5E Tiger II aircraft, and ultimately its F-16 Fighting Falcon platforms. A further 350 KFX aircraft could be exported, officials added.
The 6 October agreement calls for the establishment of a joint programme management office "to reduce the financial burden required to jointly develop the fighter by enhancing co-operation in design, prototype fabrication, test, and evaluation." Yonhap news agency put the total development cost at KRW8.5 trillion (USD8 billion): a significant increase on the USD5 billion quoted by officials in 2011 and more the KRW8 trillion quoted by KAI officials in January 2014.
COMMENT
Political concerns at the potential financial risks associated with the KFX led KAI to develop a single-engined version, dubbed the C501, that combined elements of the in-production FA-50 light fighter and the twin-engine KFX technology demonstrator, dubbed the C103. This was partly in response to a decision by the new South Korean government of President Park Geun-hye to suspend the KFX/IFX programme in early 2013.
However, in July 2014 the RoCAF and the Ministry of National Defense confirmed that KFX programme would go ahead with the twin-engine C103 design, technical development of which was completed in 2013.
Another key element of the KFX programme will be the involvement of Lockheed Martin, which has agreed to provide technical support for under the terms of the RoCAF's purchase of 40 F-35s under the FX-III acquisition. The arrangement is similar to the offsets that were agreed as part of Seoul's purchase of KF-16s: technology transfer that led directly to the development of the T-50 Golden Eagle lead-in fighter trainer and its derivatives.
A Lockheed Martin spokesman told IHS Jane's on 25 September that the F-35 deal's offset commitment would include "technical documentation, design expertise, and development investments. Specifically, Lockheed Martin will provide several hundred man-years of engineering expertise to assist Korea in the KFX design and development."
"Lockheed Martin will also provide several hundred-thousand pages of fighter aircraft technical documentation derived from existing Lockheed Martin programmes," the spokesman added.
From Jakarta's perspective, the KFX deal is the latest example of close military industrial ties with a country that has become an important supplier of - and market for - military equipment.
Indonesia is receiving 16 T-50 LIFT aircraft and Black Fox military vehicles produced by Doosan DST. South Korea's Daewoo Marine & Shipbuilding Engineering (DSME) has upgraded two Indonesian Cakra Type 209/1300-class submarines in South Korea and in December 2011 received a contract to supply three Chang Bogo-class Type 209/1200 diesel-electric attack submarines to the Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut: TNI-AL).
For its part, Seoul has ordered eight licence-produced CN235 aircraft from PTDI for the RoCAF and four maritime patrol variants for its coastguard.
[IHS Jane's Defence Weekly ] by James Hardy, London/07 October 2014
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